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VIGNETTES OF THE CRIMINAL COURT'
ALIBI OR SELF-DEFENSE
Charles C. Axado2
Here was a defendant with the natty
appearance of a matinee idol. He was
the son of a police officer who had been
on the force twenty-two years. The ac-
cused and a young companion, Gene
Stratton, accompanied two girls to the
Quadrangle Cafe. The defendant drank
to excess. The two men quarrelled. At
about one-thirty Stratton and the two
girls left in the defendant's car. After
Miss Henry was driven to her resi-
dence, the young man and Mrs. Creel
proceeded to her home. They had not
been there over twenty minutes when
the accused appeared at the door, say-
ing, "Why did you leave without me?
Don't you think I'm able to drive my-
own car?" He also charged his erst-
while friend with forcing him to pay
the bill at the cafe. At this juncture,
Stratton took the accused by the arm
and walked downstairs. Mrs. Creel
followed. By looking out the front
door she observed the accused continu-
ing his argument. She heard him say,
"Come out in the car and have a
drink." His companion remonstrated
that he did not care for any more
liquor. The defendant said, "Well, I'll
show you." Mrs. Creel then saw the
defendant step into his car and place
his hand into one of its pockets. She
ran down the stairs. She heard four or
2 This is the final installment under the above
title.
five shots fired by the time she reached
the auto. The defendant had left Strat-
ton dying in the street.
The police were notified. When Mrs.
Creel told them about the accused, the
son of Mike, their comrade, they
rushed to his home, finding him in bed.
A brother was backing the car into the
garage in the rear of their home.
The fact that the defendant had been
drinking during the evening, that he
had said during the quarrel, "Let's
have a drink," the fact that he had shot
his friend after a minor quarrel, all
tended to prove that the shooting re-
sulted as a consequence of drunken-
ness. Because the young man had led
the defendant downstairs, and there
were no eyewitnesses to the tragedy,
it would be expected that the defending
attorney would build his case upon the
theory of a shooting in self-defense dur-
ing a drunken brawl. Of course, drunk-
enness is no excuse for crime. The use
of the gun, too, is always a difficult fac-
tor to explain in a homicide. It must
have been because of these factors that
defense counsel selected a different
tack, an alibi. Perhaps he understood
that the friendly police would not
strenuously resist the effort to estab-
lish such a defense.
In addition to this reasonably ex-




pected non-resistance was the fact that
Mrs. Creel bore an unsavory reputa-
tion. Living apart from her husband,
she was charged with using various as-
sumed names. Two years ago it was
claimed she had been taken from a dis-
orderly house in a raid. Her husband
was pictured as an ex-convict. It was
brought out in cross-examination that
he had been to see her only a week
before the homicide and had pleaded
with her to come back. The defending
attorney weaved into his argument the
theory that the husband, suspicious
of his wife, had retraced her steps
this evening. Finding an intruder in
a comprising situation with his wife,
he wreaked vengeance. While the de-
fending attorney maintained that the
wife was shielding her husband, it was
apparent that she bore him no love.
The defense was in a position to offer
many witnesses in behalf of the alibi;
also, many who would attest the de-
fendant's good character. Whether an
alibi was the proper defense under
the circumstances is debatable. It was
certainly a dangerous undertaking. It
became incumbent upon the defense to
paint the character of Mrs. Creel so
black that the jury would not believe
a word she uttered. She could not be
mistaken in her statement that the ac-
cused came to her house on the fatal
night. She had been with him all even-
ing. She certainly knew him when he
knocked at her door. It was therefore
necessary for the defense to make of
her a consummate liar. Even though it
is natural that a witness of questionable
character will not be received with open
arms by a jury, still, he is under oath
and unless his testimony is shattered by
cross-examination, there is good reason
to believe it.
In concluding his final address the
defending attorney cried, "I have lived
with this defendant and slept with him
in preparing this case. He has been
serving as my clerk and investigator.
I want no other honor when I pass
away than that one word should ap-
pear on my tombstone, and that is the
word, 'Faithful.'
"If I did not do all in my power to
have you see the light, to see the inno-
cence of this boy, it were better that I
would be struck down by the Almighty
this very moment."
Other striking arguments he ad-
vanced were as follows: The police
have told you that they reached the
death car within ten minutes after the
homicide. It is natural to suppose that
the car was driven at a furious rate of
speed from the cafe to the girl's house,
a distance of six miles. Yet the police
tell you that the radiator was cool
and the tires cold.
"The police found the defendant
sleeping. Here was a boy who appears
never to have been in trouble before.
Do you think that he could commit a
cold-blooded murder and then go fast
asleep a few minutes later?
"There is no identification as to the
homicide. Not even Mrs. Creel says
that she saw the accused shoot the de-
ceased.
"Why have a good reputation if you
cannot use it when charged with a ser-
ious offense? Here is a boy who was
building a reputation for twenty-one
years. It was firmly established before
your eyes by such witnesses as a
former Assistant State's Attorney and
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a well-known judge. In a case where
the state's witnesses are of the
character shown by the evidence in this
case, a good reputation is of supreme
importance in assisting you to deter-
mine who is telling the truth. Who
would you prefer to employ or take
into your home, Mrs. Creel's husband,
Mrs. Creel. or this defendant? Would
you want your daughter to associate
with Mrs. Creel? Would you want your
son to associate with her husband?
"I did not make the bed from which
Mrs. Creel was taken by the police. I
have no desire to publish her infamy.
Whatever I say about her I feel duty-
bound to say in defending my client
against her outrageous charge.
"Mrs. Creel is contradicted by Mrs.
Hood, who was in the house just be-
fore the shooting, on two or three im-
portant details. Whom would you be-
lieve between these two witnesses?
Now, the law is that if you believe that
Mrs. Creel has wilfully and corruptly
testified falsely in regard to any mate-
rial matter in this case you have a right
to disregard her entire testimony un-
less it is corroborated by other compe-
tent testimony in evidence.
"In regard to circumstantial evi-
dence, and it is upon this type of evi-
dence that the state is relying for a
conviction in this case, the law is that
circumstantial evidence is not sufficient
unless each and every circumstance
necessary to satisfy your minds of the
guilt of the defendant has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Circum-
stantial evidence is not stronger than
its weakest link. If one of these links
is lacking there is no chain upon which
you can base a verdict of guilty."
The prosecutor began his argument
by saying that defense counsel was a
very forceful speaker. During the lat-
ter's argument the prosecutor had ap-
peared dazed. While he spoke with
diffidence at the start, before finishing
he thoroughly reviewed the evidence
from the state's viewpoint.
But the jury returned a verdict of
not guilty. They were influenced by
the police testimony in the defendant's
favor, the argument that the radiator
and the tires of the supposed "death
car" were cool, and by the prominence
of the character witnesses for the de-
fendant. The jury must have consid-
ered Mrs, Creel an arch perjurer.
Finally, they felt that the homicide was
the outcome of a hilarious evening and
that if the defendant did shoot Stratton,
it was done at a time when he did not
know what he was doing, since there
was no adequate motive for the slaying.
SU M Y
Here we have the novel situation of
a policeman's son charged with homi-
cide. We see brother police officers
rallying to the side of the accused.
While the evidence indicated rather
clearly that the accused was the only
man who had a motive to slay the de-
ceased, the defense of alibi is inter-
posed successfully for him. Of course,
the state was handicapped by the fact
that the star witness against the de-
fendant was a shady character. Her
reputation became an issue in the trial.
The jury decided it was bad and pro-
ceeded to acquit the prisoner of the
homicide. It was unquestionably a ver-
dict based upon sympathy rather than
reason.
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UNION LABOR OFFICIAL KILLS A NEGRO ORGANIZER
While the state's attorney qualified
most of the jurors for the death pen-
alty he seemingly forgot to ask this in-
quiry as to some of them. He asked
only the most essential questions in
every instance. It appeared that his
main object was to curtail the examina-
tion as much as possible. With a num-
ber of the jurors he spent not more
than two minutes. Three or four ques-
tions were asked and the men were ac-
cepted. The lack of enthusiasm upon
the part of the prosecutor may have
been due to the scarcity of evidence on
his side of the issue. At any rate, the
trial seemed a frolic for the defending
attorney. He would laugh and josh
with the judge, state's attorney, and the
jurors. When it was disclosed that two
or three of the jurors were bankers, he
asked the next prospect, "Do you own
a bank, Mr. Smith?" The judge re-
sponded most congenially to these an-
tics.
The accused was tall and heavy set,
blond and blue-eyed. He was neatly
attired and sat directly facing the jury.
He seemed to be supremely confident
of the ultimate result. There were two
co-indictees who were to be tried sepa-
rately, if at all. They were constantly
at his elbow, affording him consolation
and hope. One of the tacks taken by
the defending attorney in his examina-
tion of prospective jurors was: "Do
you believe it is legal and proper for a
group of men to organize? The right to
organize is not the issue in this case.
But we want men on the jury who will
not be prejudiced against the defendant
because he happens to be an official
who makes it his business to help or-
ganized labor."
The facts were substantially as fol-
lows: The defendant was an official in
the Flat Janitors Union. An energetic
colored man, instrumental in organiz-
ing negro janitors on the south side, in-
tended to make this group independent
of the main Flat Janitor's Union. The
defendant drove to the scene with his
two friends, also interested in the same
union. They sighted their victim riding
a bicycle. Policemen were occupying a
squad car about a block away. They
heard the shots and overcame the union
men before they had proceeded more
than two blocks from the scene. The
union men claimed that the defendant
was threatened, that the colored man
reached for a gun, and that the accused
had to shoot to protect his life. The
body of the victim was searched for
weapons. None was found. At the hos-
pital one of the policemen observed
that there were a half dozen cartridges
in the coat pockets. None of the police-
men saw any movements of the com-
batants during the affray. Neither did
they succeed in obtaining statements
from the doughty union men. It was
not long after their arrest before the
defending attorney made a motion to
have the men released on bail. In the
case of two of the men the bonds were
placed at a sum of $10,000; and as to
the man who actually did the shooting,
his bond was fixed at $20,000. The
court, in admitting the defendants in
this capital case to bail, acknowledged
that the presumption of guilt was not
evident.
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Of course, the race issue was pre-
sented inasmuch as a white man was
being charged with the murder of a
negro. His fate was to be decided by
men of his own color. The state's at-
torneys asked the jurors if they would
be influenced either one way or the
other by reason of this feature of the
case, to which question the jurors
naturally answered that such a situa-
tion would not influence them in the
least. From the lack of concern by all
taking part in the trial, an observer
was led to infer that it was not a seri-
ous matter, after all, for a white man
to slay a negro. It was startling to hear
defense counsel using the term, "Nig-
ger" in referring to the deceased while
examining jurors.
One of his questions was, "Were you
ever in a position where you were de-
prived of work because of the inter-
ference of labor unions?"
Upon learning of any experience
which might make the juror prejudicial
in his determination of the guilt or in-
nocence of the defendant, counsel
would ask, "Do you think that fact
might influence you for or against the
defendant?" He would continue, "You
would rather try a case where a union
official was not on trial, isn't that
right?"
"On the other hand, if you would be
anxious to sit upon a jury which was
deciding the fate of a union official you
would not be the type of juror best-
fitted for this case. The ideal juror is
one who is not influenced one way or
the other by reason of the defendant's
affiliation with union labor.
"The fundamental rules of law, in
their application to jury trials, are rules
of common sense best fitted to deter-
mine the truth of the issues and to do
justice to both the state and to the de-
fendant."
One juror stated that he had been a
member of a union during the period
when it launched a strike. Yet he was
accepted for service.
Defense counsel repeatedly inquired,
"Were you ever in a position where
you had to decide whether or not you
would join a union?"
"Would the result mean anything to
you in your line of business?"
"Would your participation in the
trial as a juror, or any verdict that you
might render, tend to put you in the
middle, as it were? Do you feel that
you might have to answer to somebody
for your verdict? Would you feel a
slight embarrassment in deciding a
case where a union official was on
trial?"
He asked prospective jurors whether
they owned apartment buildings and
whether they employed janitors, with a
view of finding out whether they had
ever experienced difficulty with union
labor.
"The law says that an organizer of
union labor is in a lawful business.
You believe that a business agent of a
union is following a lawful occupation,
do you not?"
There was no tenseness in the atmos-
phere of the courtroom throughout the
selection of the jury, always a favor-
able defense factor. All participants
were gay and so expressed themselves.
The prosecutor at times remarked to a
prospective juror, "I do not want to
burden you with a number of ques-
tions. All I want to know is that you
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will give this defendant a fair and im-
partial trial."
The defense made it plain that it did
not have any burden of proof in the
trial.
One of his lines of inquiry was as
follows: "If the defendant is advised
by me not to take the stand, you will
not hold that against him, will you? If
he does take the stand, you will not dis-
card his testimony simply for that rea-
son, will you??
"There may not be enough evidence
offered by the state to make out a
case and in that instance we will not
offer any evidence in defense. You
wouldn't be prejudiced against us be-
cause we didn't offer any evidence in
this case, would you?"
"If the Court instructs you that a
reasonable doubt may arise from the
state's evidence, or from a lack of
state's evidence, you will follow that
instruction, will you not?"
As a rule, the last question was,
"Would you be willing to have tweleve
men of your frame of mind sit as a
jury in a case where one who was near
and dear to you was on trial for his
liberty?"
The defending attorney was able to
discern whether a certain occupation
indicated that the individual was a
Union man or employed in an occupa-
tion where the "open shop" prevailed.
In learning that one juror was a cigar
maker he concluded that "open shop"
prevailed in that line of work, and ac-
cordingly excused him.
"Briefly the facts in the case are as
follows: A man who was breaking
the rules of the Flat Janitors' Union
was shot and killed. The defense is
self-defense. Of course, self-defense is
one of the first laws of human nature
and is recognized everywhere as a de-
fense in a trial for murder. We do not
have to prove that this killing was in
self-defense. If, from all the evidence,
you entertain a reasonable doubt
whether it was in self-defense you are
to give the defendant the benefit of
that doubt and acquit him.
"We want you to know the law and
follow it when it is given to you in the
instructions of His Honor."
By reason of the fact that the police
did not see anything, and that the union
men did not say anything, the state was
hard-pressed for evidence. In answer
to the charge, the defendant introduced
an old negro janitor who testified that
decedent, Jones, had been active in
forming an independent union, that he,
the witness, had talked to Jones on the
morning of the shooting, and that the
latter had told him that if any of the
Union men came down to his place of
business he would shoot the first one
that crossed his path.
The accused was not placed upon the
stand. This was a wise policy because
his two associates could tell the jury
a story which would exonerate the de-
fendant, and at the same time render
it unnecessary for the defendant to be
subjected to cross-examination. In the
excitement of cross-examination the
accused might say something which
would shoot a hole through the defense.
In his final argument the defending
attorney followed the same hurry up
fashion that had marked his entire con-
duct of the trial. All the evidence was
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made to fit defense theories and there
was no objection forthcoming from the
state's attorneys. They gave him free
reign to tell the jury anything that
pleased his fancy. One of his argu-
ments was based on the theory of the
law that declares that where there are
two constructions which might be placed
upon any circumstance in evidence,
one consistent with guilt, and another
consistent with innocence, the jury is
compelled to place an innocent construc-
tion upon such circumstance. He was
referring particularly to the attempted
flight of the defendant.
A novel point made was to the effect
that the map prepared by the state's
attorney's office was based on police
investigation. The draftsmen went out
to the scene to measure distances, and
then proceeded to draw the map in ac-
cordance with the facts developed by
the police and consistent with the theo-
ries to be advanced by the prosecution.
He cited the Davis Case in the 270th
Illinois to support his contention that
where there was positive testimony of
an unimpeached witness in the record,
such testimony must not be disregard-
ed. Unless there is other evidence in-
consistent with such testimony, it must
control.
He wove into his argument the pic-
ture of Jones as a "bad man," on whose
person had been found a knife and
bullets. He also told the jury about
Jones' police record. The basis for its
introduction lay in the theory that the
details of such record had come to the
attention of the defendant prior to the
shooting and they affected the defend-
ant's conduct at the time of the slay-
ing.
The state might have argued stren-
uously that the version of the defense,
that Jones had reached for a gun, was
not probable when the jury considered
that the man did not have a gun in his
possession. This obstacle is always in
the path of the accused in a self-de-
fense case where the deceased had not
in fact carried a gun.
One of the instructions supported the
defense argument that in a case of self-
defense there is no malice prompting
the defendant's action even if he shoots
to kill his assailant.
Another instruction stated that if
there was a reasonable doubt in the
minds of the jury as to any ma-
terial allegation in the indictment em-
bracing the elements of murder, there
could be no conviction.
Another stated that the defendant
was not required to prove his inno-
cence.
One of the instructions stated that
the mere fact that a life had been taken
should not cause the jury to believe
that the slaying was unlawful. Another
explained that the accused should not
be convicted simply because he was
the means of causing the death. A man
may deliberately intend to kill, and not
be held accountable for murder, if he
acts in self-defense.
The Filipi Case in the 224th Illinois
was cited in argument to show that a
man has the right to arm in order to
protect himself from a contemplated
attack. Under these circumstances, the
law holds that a man has the right
to carry a gun, even though there
is a statute which prohibits carrying
concealed weapons. While on this
phase of the case, counsel pointed out
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that the Supreme Court of the State
has held that a man might carry a gun
in his automobile without violating the
statute, if the gun was not readily ac-
cessible to him.
A forceful argument of the defense
was as follows: "If you had been ac-
.quainted with Jones' reputation, and
had known of the threats Jones made
against this defendant, and then you
met him on the street, you would
not let him reach very near his pocket
if you became involved in an alterca-
tion with him. In connection with this
principle, the law states that if a man
makes a gesture under circumstances
which reasonably cause the defendant
to believe that he is in danger of losing
his life, the defendant has the right to
shoot and kill his adversary, even
though the latter reaches for a hand-
kerchief in jest."
The jury did as might be expected
by returning an acquittal verdict in
record time.
SUMMARY
In a large city where union labor is
well-organized, resort to violence is not
an infrequent occurrence among its
leaders. They are powerful politically.
At times they appear to be a law unto
themselves. We observe a lax prose-
cution at the very start of this trial.
It seemed only necessary for the de-
fense to present its witnesses to be
assured of success. The deceased was
a humble negro. A white jury was
considering a white man's case. The
defense pulled its trump card by calling
a negro to carry but its theory of a
justifiable homicide in self-defense. It
serves as an example of a trial wherein
the defense has a walkaway.
ON TRIAL FOR MURDERING HER HUSBAND
The defendant was a woman about
fifty-five years of age. She was charged
with the murder of her husband, a
policeman. She had told such an ef-
fective story of inhuman treatment
borne at the hands of the deceased that
a coroner's jury had discharged her
from custody. The powers that be,
however, arranged to have her indicted
for murder. She did not present the
appearance of the average murderess.
There was no powder or rouge on her
face. It had been a long time since
she had been to a hairdresser. It had
been a longer time since she had pur-
chased the garments that clothed her.
The trial held no allurements of the
drama for her. Although the central
figure in a murder case, she would
have given anything to avoid the spot-
light. It was a terrific ordeal for her
to ascend the witness stand and look
into the faces of the morbidly curious
who had come to listen to her account
of the treatment to which she had been
subjected by her husband.
An alienist, one who is ever-ready
to appear upon the side of a defendant
without resources, testified that in his
opinion the accused was insane at the
time that he examined her. He spoke
of the meno-pause, saying that there
was less resistance at that period.
A boy took the stand to testify that
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only a week before, he had observed
the husband drunk. The latter had
struck him for little or no reason.
The judge instructed the jury as to
the precise purpose of the following in-
quiry upon cross-examination: "Was
this question asked of you and did you
make that answer?" He advised the
witness that the latter was not to
answer whether or not the matter re-
ferred to in the question had actually
occurred. She was merely to answer
whether she remembered that such a
question had been asked her and
whether she had answered it in that
manner.
The prosecutor had been directing
his questions to the accused along this
line: "Isn't it a fact that -?" He
was attempting to show that the wit-
ness had contradicted her present testi-
mony. The court warned him that he
must frame his questions as heretofore
indicated. He continued, "These ques-
tions are allowed only for the purpose
of laying a basis for calling witnesses
in rebuttal who will support the state
in the contention that she is telling a
different story than she told immedi-
ately after the shooting; to inform the
jury that she was now testifying incon-
sistently with her previous statements.
Unless the state is prepared to call wit-
nesses who heard her previous state-
ments, so that they will be able to show
their inconsistency with her present
testimony, such questions should not
be asked at all."
As to the actual occurrences sur-
rounding the commission of a crime,
they may be inquired into as res
gestae; also, the conduct of a defend-
ant immediately after it, indicating
guilt. But they should not be brought
out by particular questions and
answers made in an interview of the
accused by the police. Unless his
complete statement is produced and of-
fered into evidence, it should not be
used indirectly in cross-examination.
If the jury believed that the deceased
had compelled her to resort to the per-
version charged, they would undoubt-
edly acquit.
During the state's attorney's bitter
arraignment of her in final argument,
she sat in a daze, apparently oblivious
to the surroundings.
He made a close analysis of the de-
fense. He divided it in three parts:
insanity, the perversion features, and
accidental shooting.
Defense ,counsel maintained, "She
may have been sane at the time that
she told one of the state's witnesses her
telephone number, after the homicide.
The sight of blood may have brought
her to her senses."
The defense had prepared a long
hypothetical question. It contained the
following elements:
Assume a woman 55 years of age.
Meno-pause.
She was married eighteen years.
There were no children.
Her husband was given to drinking
sprees. He frequently came home
drunk.
He used vile epithets at that time.
He deserted the defendant on numer-
ous occasions.
Several times she had been forced to
leave.
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Last January 1 she had left him for
self-protection.
Her husband was very jealous and
accused her of infidelity.
Upon several occasions he forced her
(perversion).
On the ....... day of ....... , she
grabbed a bottle of poison and tried to
drink it.
On another occasion she picked up a
revolver with intent to kill herself.
Her husband came home drunk two
hours later. He broke down the garage
door with his car.
He threatened to kill her. She called
the police.
Her paternal grandfather acted
queerly. Her maternal grandmother
was affected by senile dementia.
Her father was senile at 78.
Her uncle was a religious fanatic.
Her grandmother died giving birth
to twins.
Her mother faints easily. Defendant
did not graduate from grammar school
until she was seventeen.
She was morose and brooded a great
deal.
She threatened suicide on a number
of occasions.
She applied Lysol to her food in or-
der to poison herself.
Have you an opinion whether the
assumed person was on October 4,
1939 sane or insane? Objection sus-
tained.
He arranged his hypothetical ques-
tion so as to include additional facts
brought out in the state's cross-exami-
nation of her.
Additional factors enumerated were:
"Immediately thereafter this sup-
posed person went into the bathroom
and ."
Her liver and kidneys were found to
be exceptionally large.
Suppose that this woman, about ten
days thereafter, was examined by psy-
chiatrists and that in their examination
they ascertained that her grandfather
Her father failed in the grocery
business.
Of the defense doctor, counsel sug-
gested: "Describe to the jury what you
found on your last examination." An-
swer: "Her lower jaw was cut and
bruised. She said that her husband
had hit her there."
Cross-examination of the defense
alienist by the state:
Was she sane or insane during your
examination? I have no opinion.
Your opinion was based on your ex-
amination that morning? The court
objected.
What is dementia praecox? Answer:
Disturbance of the emotions. There
are two types. One is lacking in emo-
tions. The other is the melancholy
type, the shut-in. He feels that he is
being abused, insulted. He weeps easi-
ly. His mind is cloudy. He is forgetful.
Are these tvo types accepted by ex-
perts on mental disease? (An eminent
alienist was assisting the cross-exami-
nation.)
How many other forms of insanity
are there? There is the Katatonic type
that believes he is pursued. The para-
noiac believes that the world is against
him.
In obtaining her personal history,
how did you go about it?
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You assumed that her answers were
true, did you not?
What happened on the second visit?
Is senile dementia hereditary? Yes.
Is that answer based upon medical
authorities? Yes.
Are the other forms of mental
trouble that you speak of inherited?
Suppose that you leave out the his-
tory pertaining to the grandmother, the
grandfather, her father and her mother,
would your answer be the same? (The
process of elimination is always a
means of effective cross-examination in
these cases.)
What effect did the father being mar-
ried three times have upon her sanity
or insanity? Objection sustained.
Leaving out the life history of the
defendant, what do you base your
opinion upon? Answer: Because she
had been subjected to great mental
torture and stress. (Unwritten law
invoked by a clever witness.)
Supposing you added the fact that on
July 1, 1925, she was laughing and talk-
ing to neighbors. Objection sustained.
There was a dispute as to this evidence.
Assuming that the acts of perversion
were not true, would that change your
opinion?
You knew that she had shot and
killed her husband a month before
your examination.
Would you expect her to be joyful
and playful instead of melancholy?
Have you ever seen a sane person
joyous after a killing?
Did you make any notes on the act
of perversion? Privately, yes.
Will you refer to those notes?
Additional parts of hypothetical
questions:
Her brother was a Salvation Army
exhorter on street corners.
She threw herself on the lounge sev-
eral times.
Her husband was a chronic alcoholic.
She was ten years old according to
intelligence tests.
A physical, nervous, and mental ex-
amination had been made.
With all these elements and facts
suggested in the previous question, and
in addition, the fact that after the slay-
ing she was capable of making some
statements to the effect that , do
you have an opinion as to whether the
subject was sane or insane?
When did you last examine the de-
fendant? Saturday.
From your examination on that day,
have you an opinion as to her sanity or
insanity last Saturday? Her mind has
cleared up. She is much improved, al-
most normal. (The theory of the
defense was that she had been insane
at the time of the murder and sane
now.)
The defendant presented a pitiful
spectacle on the stand. She was con-
stantly crying. To the prosecutor's
inquiry: Was this question asked and
did you make this answer?, she always
replied, "I don't remember."
"When did you decide to kill him?"
This was a trick question, double-bar-
reled.
More cross-examination of the de-
fense alienist:
What did she tell you about the
shooting? Answer: "I don't know much
about handling a gun. The first thing
that I knew, it exploded!"
Re-direct examination. Have you an
opinion as to what intention she had
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when she picked up the gun? An ob-
jection was sustained, but the inference
was "suicide."
Upon rebuttal, a life insurance man
testified that he had seen the deceased
nearly every day. He had not seen him
drunk in the fourteen years that he
knew him. He saw him at eleven
o'clock on the day of the murder and
he was sober.
A filling station attendant was then
called.
Did you know the deceased officer?
Yes.
Did you know the defendant? Yes.
Did you ever have occasion to visit
their home? Yes.
Did you observe the conduct of the
defendant? Yes.
Fix the time of your visits.
Do you have an opinion whether
the defendant was sane or insane at
that time? An objection was sustained,
on the ground that the visits predated
the time when the defense claimed that
she was insane.
What did the defendant do, if any-
thing, while you were there?
Based on what you saw and heard,
have you an opinion? The court held
that the witness had not qualified to
give an opinion.
Upon cross-examination, defense
counsel brought into the record the
reputation of the accused as a peaceful
and law-abiding citizen.
An old woman who had visited the
defendant was then asked her opinion.
An objection was sustained.
Was she melancholy? Objection sus-
tained. (Leading question.)
Another woman was called by the
state to tell of her observations of the
defendant immediately after the shoot-
ing. The court exclaimed, "How is this
rebuttal? You should have offered this
evidence in your examination-in-chief."
Upon cross-examination, defense
counsel asked, "Did you hear the de-
fendant say, "I can't stand this any
longer."
The prosecutor next called an of-
ficer in charge of the deceased's per-
sonal police record, kept in the
ordinary course of business.
"Please refer to the records."
"Have you refreshed your mind?"
"Can you say whether, when he re-
ported at 3:30, he was sober? Yes.
Where did he call from at 5 o'clock?
Answer: At his regular post.
When did you receive the next call?
Officers sometime call up for each
other. The box number of the post
registers on a tape.
A police captain then testified that
he had never seen the deceased drunk.
He also testified that he had inter-
viewed the defendant after the shooting
and that in his opinion she was sane.
Cross examination: Isn't it a fact
that you told the Coroner that she
should not be held for murder?
Didn't you say that you had seen the
garage door broken?
The prosecutor made a powerful ar-
gument for conviction. With the un-
written law on the other side, he fought
valiantly to overcome it.
The defense attorney predictea:
"You will be treated to such eloquence
as you have never heard from the lips
of mortal man. The prosecutor is at
home in these cases. My practice is
largely civil. I seldom come into the
criminal courts. I may not be ac-
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quainted with the tricks that are at
the disposal of my opponent and which
can be called forth with the ease of a
magician. I happen to be in this case
simply because I am a neighbor of this
poor woman and somebody had to de-
fend her."
"What a nagging, worrying, miser-
able life she had. A life of hell.
"We want either the electric chair
or an acquittal. No compromise.
"If there had been 'another woman'
in the case there would have been a
motive for her act. As it is, where is
the motive? There is none. Her act
was but the release of stemmed-up
emotion.
"What a cold-blooded murder was
revealed in the prosecutor's opening
statement. That was the way he would
like to have it. But the evidence
proved otherwise.
"The state's alienist prepared the hy-
pothetical question that the prosecutor
asked. Naturally the doctor was pre-
pared to analyze and give his reasons
for arriving at his opinion. When I
asked him my hypothetical question he
didn't have an opinion. He is a $100-
a-day man. Who wouldn't have a
favorable opinion for that?"
The defense had made an opening
statement in this case.
"Suicide is not a crime. A man is
invariably insane at the time. At com-
mon law, if a man in the act of com-
mitting suicide, killed another, and he
was found sane, he was declared guilty
of manslaughter. If insane, there was
no crime." (The defending attorney
was attempting to weave the theory
that the deceased was possibly shot
while the accused was attempting to
commit suicide.)
In the course of the prosecutor's
closing argument, he said:
"The father of the officer had testi-
fied that his boy had waved good-bye
to his wife the day before the homicide.
(Directly after the alleged act of per-
version.)
"Another witness testified that the
husband had been seen to throw out
garbage at that very hour.
The jury apparently satisfied with
proof of the husband's bestiality re-
turned a verdict of not guilty.
SUMMARY
A woman is on trial for the murder
of her husband. We hear her recount
the wrongs committed against her by
the deceased over a span of many years.
The impression is generated that she
had a right to end that life of hell by re-
moving the cause There were no
eye-witnesses, as is frequently the case
under these circumstances. The facts
of the tragedy are developed to show
that the deceased was the assailant and
that the shooting by the accused was
in necessary self-defense. This ac-
count is given to the jury so that they
will have something to hang their hat
on in returning an acquittal verdict.
These facts enable the jury to reconcile
the acquittal with the dictates of the
law. But as a matter of fact it is the
unwritten law which leads them to
acquit.
